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Law Protecting Rights: Restoring 
the law of self-determination 
in the neo-colonial world
Amy Maguire
Introduction
In light of the continuing state dominance of international legal 
relations, it is questionable whether international law adequately 
protects the right of self-determination. Yet, as it is enshrined in 
international law, self-determination retains great emancipatory 
promise. It is therefore essential that the law of self-determination, and 
its means of implementation, further evolve in order to harness the 
right’s full potential in the wide range of twenty-first century claims 
to the right. In this paper I consider self-determination in relation to 
the contemporary rights claims of Irish nationalists and Indigenous 
peoples in Australia. This comparison allows for an analysis both of 
the impacts of colonialism in the present and of the various means by 
which self-determination may be asserted today. I am advancing two 
central arguments: firstly, that self-determination retains a mission 
of decolonisation in the twenty-first century; and secondly, that a 
‘human rights approach’ to self-determination presents the best means 
of advancing the rights of contemporary claimants while protecting 
the rights of non-claimants.
Alongside doctrinal legal analysis, I have conducted 28 in-depth 
research interviews in Ireland and Australia in order to consider 
self-determination, its definitions and its scope from a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective, and to develop a critique of the state of the law in the area. 
The rationale for using a socio-legal method to explore an international 
law topic is to bring human voices to international legal analysis, and to 
advocate the opening of international legal discourse to the perspectives 
of non-state actors. In both research sites, interviews were conducted 
with lawyers, academics, human rights activists, community workers 
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and politicians, with the aim of gaining both a breadth of perspectives 
and a depth of analysis from people intimately engaged with the issues 
of self-determination. Data from this qualitative research is included 
in this article, first, to shed light on the meaning of self-determination 
and, second, to demonstrate some of the arenas in which contemporary 
claimants to the right identify the stifling influence of colonialism.
This paper explores some of the key practical and theoretical 
proposals which have emerged through my analysis of interview 
data and secondary material, particularly in relation to self-
determination and colonialism. First I briefly consider the meaning 
of self-determination itself. Secondly I argue that colonial experience 
continues to impinge upon peoples’ capacity to assert and realise self-
determination. Finally I propose some means by which law’s protection 
of self-determination might be extended in order to fulfil the right’s 
emancipatory potential.
Self-determination: Legal status and meaning
The concept of self-determination has its origins in the Enlightenment, 
but it did not emerge as a principle of international law until the early 
twentieth century. During the post–World War One peace talks in 
Versailles, US President Woodrow Wilson began to talk about ‘self-
determination’ as ‘an imperative principle of action’ guiding the 
re-drawing of the maps of Europe (1918). In the Wilsonian sense, 
however, self-determination was purely the right of peoples when 
organised as ‘nations’, and its application was in practice limited to 
those new states which the victorious powers intended to create out 
of the ruins of war. In recognising self-determination only where this 
was politically expedient, the dominant forces in the international 
community at this time established a precedent of the dominance 
of politics over law which continues to impinge upon the right in 
the twenty-first century. Just as the intensely hierarchical nature of 
international relations during the early twentieth century prevented 
the rights claims of colonised peoples being treated equally to the 
rights of existing states (Ishay 2004), so do contemporary claimant 
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peoples struggle to make their claims heard on the international 
stage. Nevertheless, the term self-determination gained a foothold in 
international legal discourse at Versailles.
  Self-determination then took on the status of a firm pillar 
of international law following the Second World War, when it was 
included as a foundation principle in the United Nations Charter 
(Brownlie 2003). Building on this precedent, self-determination 
assumed a central place in the international Bill of Rights. The right 
was enshrined and defined in Common Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.
This statement is echoed in relation to Indigenous peoples by the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in September 2007.
On this legal basis, over the past four decades self-determination 
has become the most significant and commonly asserted of the human 
rights owed to peoples rather than individuals. The right stands in 
opposition to the absolute dominance of states within the international 
order. It is crucial in enabling communities to preserve and protect 
their distinct identities (Daes 1993). Indeed, the UN Rapporteur on 
self-determination described the right as ‘an essential condition or 
prerequisite … for the genuine existence of the other human rights 
and freedoms’ (Gros Espiell 1980: [59]). While the most significant 
engagement of self-determination to date has been the project of 
decolonisation, Common Article 1 of the twin covenants confirms 
that the right has universal application (Crawford 2001). Forty years 
on, this provision stands as a positive and binding statement that the 
domination of one people by another will not be legally tolerated 
(McCorquodale 1995). As will be discussed below, however, the 
strength of self-determination in legal terms has been undermined 
by political realities.
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Frederic Kirgis has described self-determination as a right with 
many ‘faces’. These include, but are not limited to, secession, freedom 
from colonial domination, integration with an existing state, limited 
autonomy within a state, and protection of minority groups (Kirgis 
1994). Practical examples demonstrate that the right may manifest 
across a broad spectrum, and while it is this flexibility that makes self-
determination uniquely adaptable to the needs of all peoples, the lack 
of a constant and defined application for the right has prompted James 
Crawford (2001) to critique the right as lex obscura or uncertain law.
To give human context to the meaning of self-determination, I 
have asked interview respondents what the right means to them on 
a practical level. I argue that the term ‘self-determination’ offers the 
best clue for how to define the concept; the meaning of the right must 
be contextualised and defined by peoples themselves in their unique 
circumstances. For some people, the right begins at an individual level 
before taking on its role within the collective:
I think self-determination is within yourself, being proud of who you are. 
Aboriginal people find that really hard because you have all these people 
knocking you down all the time (Mundine 2006).
Indeed, self-determination may be seen to actuate on several 
layered levels:
Self-determination means the right of a nation to determine its own 
political, social, economic and cultural affairs, and its own relations to 
other peoples and other nations. Within that it also means the rights 
of specific communities, whether they be geographical communities 
or communities of interest, for example gendered, racialised or ethnic 
communities, and it means that they can do exactly the same things in the 
context of the nation. It is for the individual too (Ó Broin 2006).
As Ó Broin asserts, self-determination is often bound up with 
political autonomy, yet Paul O’Connor demonstrates that the right 
is also important for dispossessed peoples in terms of culture and 
identity:
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I certainly would argue that freedom in the political sphere also means 
freedom in the social and cultural spheres as well. For instance, I find it 
frustrating that my children are using textbooks that have got no cultural 
relevance to them (O’Connor 2006).
Just as, depending on context, self-determination can be understood 
in political, social, economic, cultural or other terms, so too can 
discrete exercises of the right be far more localised. As Linda Burney 
explains, not every exercise of self-determination must result in full 
independence for a people:
The international definition is a fine set of words, but realistically it 
would be difficult to find many places in the world where the practice 
of self-determination includes all of those elements. In the context of an 
individual community in New South Wales — Bega, La Perouse, Yamba or 
wherever — it is about Aboriginal people being able to take responsibility 
for decision-making that will affect them (Burney 2006).
The highly contextualised nature of self-determination represents 
one aspect of the right which powerful international actors, especially 
nation states, have typically failed or refused to understand. Certainly 
some self-determination claims involve challenges to state sovereignty 
and existing borders, such as those asserted by Irish nationalists, 
Palestinians and Basques. However, many other claims, notably those 
typically made by Indigenous peoples in Australia, seek autonomy 
within existing nation states and promote the notion of co-existing 
forms of sovereignty within the same territory.
The variety of characterisations of self-determination offered 
by participants in this research demonstrate that the definition in 
international law is but a starting point for peoples seeking control over 
their own destinies. Indeed, attempts to impose restrictive definitions 
of the right actually serve to deny the right’s true nature and potential. 
Only a self-determining people can determine what the right means 
for them. This is a difficult fact for law and lawyers to face, however, 
and examples from both Irish and Indigenous Australian contexts show 
that the right is currently inadequately protected by international law 
and institutions. As I discuss in the following section, those engaged 
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in the evolution of the international law of self-determination must 
be confronted with the fact that colonial experiences continue to stifle 
peoples’ achievement of self-determination.
Self-determination and the 
mission of decolonisation
Some key theorists of colonialism have influenced my exploration of 
the relationship between colonialism and self-determination. I follow 
Frantz Fanon’s view that the history of colonialism is ‘the history of 
pillage’, and that colonialism imposes material and moral violence 
which must be struggled against (1965: 41, Sharawy 2003). This 
research has included in-depth interviews with people struggling 
for self-determination in Ireland and Australia, in order to listen 
to the voices of the colonised and honour their demands for self-
determination (Sartre in Fanon 1965: 12). I also concur with Judge 
Ammoun’s famous separate opinions in the Namibia (1971) and Western 
Sahara (1975) cases before the International Court of Justice that 
colonialism is a plague which causes a distortion in history for the 
colonised. The judge argued that self-determination is the only means 
by which a claimant people may overcome that historical distortion 
and reassert their independence. The greatest obstacle to claimant 
peoples who seek to use the right in this way is that international law 
has not yet engaged with its Eurocentric bias, with the result that 
colonialism rarely features prominently in international legal analysis 
(Anghie 2004: 34). Instead, as Antony Anghie (2004) recognises, 
having been born from colonialism, international law now reproduces 
colonialism at every turn.
Some international legal commentators have argued in recent 
times that the process of decolonisation, which reached its peak in the 
1960s and 1970s, has all but reached its conclusion (Pearson 2006a). 
For example, Christine Bell (2005) finds colonialism to be a fairly 
unhelpful tool of analysis in relation to sovereignty debates in Ireland 
and asserts more generally that self-determination solutions which do 
not alter existing borders are typically more appropriate in the present 
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day. I argue, however, that evidence from both Ireland and Australia 
demonstrates the continued influence of colonialism over claims to self-
determination. International legal actors and institutions are challenged 
to confront both the legacy and the contemporary experience of 
colonialism if international law is to offer adequate protection to the 
right of self-determination and act more forcefully to compel states 
to respect the right. This research is one site in which the influence of 
colonialism over self-determination claims can be made more explicit 
in international legal discourse.
Case studies from Ireland and 
Indigenous Australia
In many ways the circumstances of nationalists in the North of Ireland 
and Indigenous peoples in Australia could not be more different. 
Indeed, the key distinction between the two case studies is that Irish 
nationalists claim self-determination in the form of a reunited Ireland, 
thus challenging the status of existing state borders, whilst almost all 
self-determination claims advanced by Indigenous peoples in Australia 
propose some form of autonomous solution within the existing state 
structure. Yet this essential difference is one of the two most important 
reasons for comparing the two cases. Consideration of different types 
of self-determination claims illuminates the adaptable nature of the 
right and challenges the typical statist view that self-determination 
necessarily entails a claim to secession and a challenge to a state’s 
territorial integrity.
The other important reason for this comparison of the Irish 
nationalist and Indigenous Australian claims is that both claims 
are heavily influenced by a colonial experience which has not been 
adequately recognised either at the domestic or international level. 
Irish nationalists and Indigenous peoples in Australia continue to 
experience ‘settler colonialism’ (see Clayton 1996). This experience 
is distinct from the ‘salt-water’ colonialism suffered by the many 
recently formed nation states whose right to self-determination was 
upheld by international law through the project of decolonisation. 
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Contemporary legal commentators have recognised that the salt-water 
test of colonialism, which aimed to impose predictability by ruling out 
claims from peoples not separated by an ocean from their colonisers, 
was manifestly unjust (Hurrell 2003) and indefensible (Wippman 
1998). The maintenance of the salt-water test throughout the project 
of decolonisation has marginalised peoples who have experienced 
other forms of colonialism.
In this section I explore the responses of interview participants in 
both Ireland and Australia. In each interview, respondents were asked 
whether they identified a continuing colonial influence over their 
community’s claim to self-determination. There was almost universal 
agreement across the 28 interviews conducted that colonialism does 
continue to impinge upon contemporary self-determination claims 
in Ireland and by Indigenous peoples in Australia. However, as this is 
a qualitative study, the depth of the data gathered is more interesting 
than the degree of correlation between responses. Not only did 
almost all participants agree that colonialism was a continuing force 
in their lives, but they gave rich and diverse explanations of the real 
effects of colonialism. This type of analysis has rarely been included 
in international legal discourse.
Ireland
In Ireland, the partitioned north-eastern six counties represent a last 
vestige of British colonialism. The border of 1920 remains in place, 
despite its international illegitimacy and status as a ‘religion-linked, 
political gerrymander’ (Swan 1986: 139). The legacy of the colonial 
mindset, promoted by the British state in Ireland through a range of 
means as recently as the twentieth century, may still be seen in the 
social imperialism expressed by some British unionist politicians who 
resent power-sharing and negotiation with Irish nationalists. Further, 
sectarianism is reinforced by the British state as is clear in the case of 
John Taylor, a former unionist politician who in 1991 advised a group 
of young people that one in three Catholics was either a murderer or 
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a supporter of murder (McKay 2000: 363–4). Taylor now holds a life 
peerage in the House of Lords.
In all but one of my interviews in Ireland respondents recognised 
a continued colonial British influence in the North of Ireland. 
Contemporary colonialism in Ireland, however, is less explicit than 
in past centuries. In arguing that colonialism relates not to distance 
but to type of administration, Robert McCorquodale (2006) asks: ‘Is 
the type of administration a foreign administration over those who 
are different and who don’t share the same approach?’ The use of the 
term ‘foreign’ is complicated in the Northern Irish context because 
around half of the constituents of that jurisdiction identify themselves 
as British, ‘Northern Irish’ or ‘Ulstermen’ and remain accepting of 
British governance. For Irish nationalists across the island, however, 
British rule is both foreign and different in approach from how 
they imagine governance in a unified Ireland. Like McCorquodale, 
Bernadette McAliskey (2006) rejects the salt-water approach to colonial 
categorisation, finding that the British presence in Ireland has never 
been appropriately named as colonial due to the erroneous perception 
that colonies must be distant from the imperial power. Further, 
several respondents to this study identified the unaccountability of the 
British ruling class as a signifier of continued colonialism. Anthony 
Coughlan (2006) admits finding colonial terms somewhat simplistic, 
but nevertheless states: ‘The classic characterisation of colonialism was 
a subordinate people who had their laws made by others, by foreigners, 
and Britain does still do that in Northern Ireland’. Terry Enright 
(2006) is far more explicit in his condemnation of the unaccountable 
British politicians and bureaucrats who continue to share power with 
the Northern Ireland Assembly: ‘These people are like a secret society, 
behind closed doors, who still think of us as the natives and still think 
that the natives have to be told how to live and what to do’.
A further active legacy of colonialism in Ireland is the failure of 
the British state to confront its own role in the conflict. In August 
2007 Britain withdrew the last representatives of its wartime garrison 
in Ireland, leaving what it terms a ‘peacetime’ garrison of no more 
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than 5000 soldiers. However, Britain continues to promote what 
is known as the ‘community relations’ conception of the conflict 
in Ireland, which depicts the British state as the neutral arbiter of 
a community-based conflict. Paul O’Connor, director of the Pat 
Finucane Centre — an NGO focused on gaining justice for families of 
those killed by the state during the conflict — rejects the community 
relations analysis. He argues that the state’s role in collusion with 
police and loyalists in the murder of civilians, the shoot-to-kill policy, 
Bloody Sunday, torture and detention without trial (see Larkin 2004) 
evidence the state’s role as a combatant rather than a mediator in the 
conflict (O’Connor 2006). Indeed, during the period known as the 
Troubles British soldiers were directly responsible for the killings 
of 301 people, including 138 Catholic civilians and 20 Protestant 
civilians. On 25 June 2007, despite comprehensive findings of state 
collusion in the murders of several civilians during the conflict, the 
Public Prosecutions Service announced that it would not prosecute 
any member of the British security forces or police (Press Notice: 
Public Prosecution Service — Conclusion on Stevens III 25 June 2007). 
Immediately following Canadian judge Cory’s recommendation that 
an independent inquiry be held into the killing of Catholic solicitor 
Pat Finucane, the Westminster parliament passed a new Inquiries Act 
2005, which enables the state to withdraw incriminating information 
from the defence, prosecution and the judge. Belfast lawyer Niall 
Murphy (2006) questions how truth and justice can be served under 
this new statute, which is clearly designed to protect the interests of 
the state over the citizens.
A further aspect of continued colonial influence identified by Irish 
respondents to this study was the dominance of British culture over 
Irish culture within many areas of social life. An obviously contentious 
display of British culture occurs each July during the Orange marching 
season. In 2006, having established a Parades Commission as a means 
of developing rights-based and negotiated solutions to contentious 
marches, the Northern Ireland Office appointed an Orangeman 
previously found liable for unfair employment practices against 
nationalists to head the commission. In contrast, those with Irish 
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identities face greater obstacles in freely expressing those identities. 
Paul O’Connor (2006) complains that his children’s education is not 
culturally relevant, because British points of reference — such as 
visiting Big Ben — are used in children’s textbooks. Of particular 
current concern is the inability of either the British government or 
the Northern Ireland Assembly to give appropriate legislative support 
to the Irish language (Enright 2006). Many people promote the use 
of the Irish language as a means of claiming their cultural identity 
(Murphy 2006). Under the European Convention on Regional and 
Minority Languages and the Good Friday Agreement, Britain was 
obliged to establish legislation protecting the rights of the rapidly 
growing number of Irish speakers in the north of Ireland. Further, 
Britain made a commitment to introduce this legislation in the St 
Andrews agreement which preceded the recent re-establishment of 
the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly. A public consultation round 
was held and the overwhelming majority of responses were in favour of 
rights-based legislative protection for the language. However, Britain 
failed to introduce the legislation before power over cultural rights 
was devolved to the unionist-dominated Assembly. The Assembly, 
dominated by the Ian Paisley–founded Democratic Unionist Party, 
appears to have abandoned any commitment to enacting the legislation, 
with DUP member Nelson McCausland linking the Irish language 
to the IRA armed campaign and describing efforts to promote it as a 
form of ‘cultural rearmament’ (2007).
Australia
All Indigenous respondents to this research identified a continuing 
colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Australian 
state. In this regard they echoed the famous comment on contemporary 
colonialism made by Yawuru elder and Aboriginal spokesman, Patrick 
Dodson, in his influential Fourth Annual Vincent Lingiari Memorial 
Lecture of 1999. Dodson titled his lecture ‘Until the Chains are Broken: 
Aboriginal Unfinished Business’. The title was a reference to an excerpt 
from Frank Hardy’s book The Unlucky Australians:
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Will I, having written it, be free to turn to other books and obsessions, 
will you, having read it, be free to turn to the pursuit of happiness, will 
the lucky country remain free while the unlucky Australians are in 
chains? (Hardy 2006)
The colonial ‘chains’ which continue to bind Indigenous peoples 
in Australia, in Dodson’s conception, are diverse and diffuse; in all, 
he identified 17 elements of ‘Aboriginal unfinished business’ which 
must be settled before the colonial legacy may be overcome. As was 
reflected by the variety of responses from Indigenous participants in 
this research, contemporary colonialism in Australia goes far beyond 
the historical and continuing dispossession of land and resources to 
encompass myriad forms of domination and disempowerment.
Even in the post-Mabo period, as Irene Watson states (2006), 
Australian legal and public institutions have failed to recognise or 
respect continuing Aboriginal sovereignty. The High Court has 
stated categorically that it has no jurisdiction to inquire into the 
acquisition of sovereignty by Britain in Australia (Mabo v Queensland 
(No 2), hereinafter Mabo), and consequently a native title regime has 
been developed which requires Indigenous claimants to establish an 
unbroken link between their ‘traditional laws and customs’ as practised 
at the time of European colonisation and those laws and customs which 
they continue to practise today in connection with their traditional 
lands (Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria, Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth) section 223). Nor has the Australian Constitution 
evolved to the point where it would drive, or at least facilitate, a 
fundamental alteration in the relationship between Indigenous peoples 
and the Australian state (Behrendt 2006). The absence of recognition 
of Indigenous sovereignty by the Australian legal and constitutional 
framework is hardly surprising, however, in light of Linda Burney’s 
comment that the prior occupation of Australia by Indigenous people 
was not legally recognised until the Mabo decision of 1992 (Burney 
2006). The framework of ‘settlement’ and ‘terra nullius’ which 
justified the colonisation of Australia in the eyes of Anglo-Australian 
law meant that the colonial relationship did not develop to the point 
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reached in other comparable colonial countries, such as New Zealand/
Aotearoa, the United States and Canada, where prior ownership was 
acknowledged through treaties (Calma 2006).
One of the key practical legacies of this failure to recognise 
Indigenous sovereignty has been the development of administrative 
frameworks which isolate and patronise Indigenous people in the 
present day. This is evident in the lack of proportional representation of 
Indigenous people in important social institutions such as parliaments, 
the judiciary and the education system, a circumstance which Irabinna 
Rigney (2006) believes demonstrates the ongoing disproportion of 
power between Indigenous and non-Indigenous in Australia. Aden 
Ridgeway, at the time of interview the only Indigenous senator in 
the Commonwealth Parliament, asserts that a consequence of this lack 
of representation is a governmental attitude that Indigenous people 
remain, in a sense, ‘wards of the state’. Ridgeway (2006) argues 
that this attitude results in a colonial governmental approach which 
emphasises Indigenous disadvantage, and suggests that governments are 
best placed to decide for Indigenous peoples how their circumstances 
might be improved. A parallel concern expressed by Professor Mick 
Dodson (2006) is that the disempowerment of Indigenous people 
means that governments typically make decisions affecting the lives of 
individuals and communities without seeking or gaining Indigenous 
consent. Dodson gives the example of the 2006–2007 abolition of the 
permit system in the Northern Territory, whereby it was no longer 
necessary for outsiders to gain permits to enter private and freehold 
Aboriginal property. As is the case for Irish nationalists in Northern 
Ireland, Indigenous people in Australia continue to identify a colonial 
legacy in the marginalisation of their voices and ignorance of their 
concerns.
An abiding and unfortunate consequence of the marginalisation of 
Indigenous people from positions of influence in Australian society is 
the continued prevalence of racist and discriminatory attitudes towards 
Indigenous people. Larissa Behrendt (2006) asserts that Australia has 
not changed psychologically as a country, and that while the dominant 
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community appears to resent public debates about racism or Indigenous 
rights, a key concern for many Indigenous people is bringing an end 
to the discrimination they routinely suffer. Arguably one of the key 
indicators of this abiding discrimination towards Indigenous people 
is the replacement and erasure of Indigenous cultures that continues 
in the present day (Rigney 2006). The problem of cultural erasure is 
emphasised as a key colonial barrier to Indigenous self-determination 
by Noel Pearson, who comments:
There’s never been agreement by the country to say that Indigenous 
peoples are entitled to maintain their distinct identities, to maintain 
their languages, to maintain the integrity of their relationship with their 
traditional lands — we’ve not reached the point where those things have 
been proclaimed as foundations for moving forward (Pearson 2006b).
Encapsulated in Pearson’s comment is an idea which is also inherent 
in a wide range of comments made by participants in this research — 
namely, that colonialism abides wherever there is a failure to recognise 
and respect every people’s equal right to self-determination.
The challenge for international law
Such examples demonstrate the gaps between the international legal 
standards set for self-determination and the political will of nation states 
to protect peoples’ right to self-determination. Britain, particularly 
during the sovereignty dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, 
has been one of the most prominent champions of the right to self-
determination in the international forum, notably commenting that 
the right is owed to all peoples, even those inside British borders (UK 
representative to the UN 1982: 432). Yet, so often in the case of the 
Irish people in Northern Ireland, Britain has disregarded its obligations 
and commitments under international law by failing to make space 
for the expression of their right to self-determination. Similarly, 
the conclusion of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (1999) that amendments to Australia’s native title laws 
led by the Howard government were in breach of racial discrimination 
standards did not persuade Australia to alter its course. Indigenous 
26
Maguire
respondents to my study have said that the Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples which was recently adopted by the UN was of 
such significance because it is the only legal instrument they have with 
which to confront state intransigence on self-determination (Davis 
2006, Dodson 2006). Clearly, then, the evolution of international law 
must be accompanied by renewed political will on the part of states to 
respect and enable self-determination for all peoples.
Restoring the law of self-determination 
through international law
For claimants of self-determination who continue to struggle against 
the suppression of their rights through colonialism, the most pressing 
concern remains survival and the maintenance of distinct identities. 
Another key question, however, is whether international law can evolve 
in the twenty-first century to ensure that self-determination does not 
lose its emancipatory potential. I turn now to some suggestions of 
means by which the utility of self-determination may be enhanced.
Decolonising the law of self-determination
In order to achieve its contemporary mission of decolonisation, the 
law of self-determination must itself be decolonised. A key means of 
achieving this is by enabling the variety of legitimate manifestations 
of the right. It has always suited states to depict self-determination 
as inherently threatening to state sovereignty, but in law the right 
is capable of being realised as anything from independence from 
colonial rule to the exercise of autonomy within state borders 
or the enjoyment of democratic governance in an existing state 
arrangement (Kirgis 1994: 307). Robert McCorquodale (2006) 
regards this statist tendency to emphasise the risk of secession as a 
‘deliberate misunderstanding’ designed to maintain state control over 
sovereignty at all costs. Undoubtedly the Irish nationalist claim to self-
determination does challenge existing state borders, but Indigenous 
peoples in Australia very rarely assert self-determination claims which 
challenge the sovereignty of the Australian state. A decolonised law of 
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self-determination must countenance the variety of assertions of the 
right, and in doing so should motivate the international community 
to engage with each claim on its own merits.
An allied means of decolonising the law of self-determination 
is through breaking down the artificial dichotomy which has been 
proposed between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ self-determination. In 
this characterisation, external self-determination, or independent 
statehood, is regarded as highly threatening and only permitted in cases 
of severe oppression by a dominant state. Internal self-determination, 
such as limited autonomy within existing borders, is typically preferred. 
I oppose the use of this division in international legal discourse as 
unhelpful and designed to always preference the political interests of 
states. The statist world has been definitively eroded (Falk 2000: 112) 
in law — if not in practice — and the artificial opposition between 
external and internal self-determination is inapplicable given ‘the 
reality of multiple human associational patterns in today’s world’ 
(Anaya 1996: 81). The law of self-determination can be decolonised 
by abandoning these arbitrary categories and empowering claimant 
peoples to frame self-determination in their own terms.
Group identity and the state
The evolution of self-determination in the twenty-first century is also 
required to develop state acceptance of the right’s continued place 
in the international legal order. This is an area for the intervention 
of international law and legal analysis since, as Antonio Cassese 
recognises, the law on self-determination presently fails to countenance 
the claims of, or provide legal remedies to, ethnic, national, religious, 
cultural or linguistic minorities:
In short … international law takes a ‘statist view of self-determination’. Of 
course, political stability and the territorial integrity of States are important 
values that need not be disregarded. … On the other hand, one cannot fail 
to note that international law could provide a host of contingency solutions 
which while not undermining the international legal order, would be 
likely to pay regard to the aspirations of those groups and minorities that 
suffer from discrimination and oppression (1995: 328).
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If international law is currently complicit in supporting an overly 
statist interpretation of self-determination then it has a role to play in 
making that right a less threatening proposition for states. Arguably 
the human rights approach to self-determination (discussed below) has 
the potential to promote this development in that it makes secession 
and conflict less likely outcomes of self-determination claims based 
in a particular group identity and builds in rights protections for 
those with competing worldviews. To enhance this outcome states 
ought to question their traditional opposition to assertions of group 
identity. State engagement with people’s claims to self-determination 
would be in keeping with international law’s acknowledgement that 
political boundaries are legitimate because they protect groups as well 
as individuals (Binder 1992–1993: 225).
Nationalist and claimant movements, for their part, could respond 
to an increased state engagement with self-determination claims by 
rejecting exclusivist modes of definition and embracing pluralism. 
In Ireland Sinn Féin is attempting such a transition by moving away 
from the narrow cultural focus of Irish nationalism towards civic 
republicanism and inclusivity (Ó Broin 2006). It is to be hoped that 
future conceptions of self-determination in the Irish context can re-
conceive of group identity as a unifying notion and move beyond the 
stultifying question of which group deserves what towards arrangements 
which advance the interests of all people on the island.
Empowering peoples through an inclusive 
international legal system
Almost thirty years ago Lee Buchheit challenged international law to 
affirm self-determination’s continued currency and avoid ‘an uncritical 
affirmation of the supremacy of the “sovereign” state’ (Buchheit 1978: 
7). The capacity of self-determination to force international actors 
to question the assumptions inherent in international law could be 
enhanced through a restructuring of international legal institutions 
(Lâm 1992). Should the international legal system be opened to the 
participation of peoples, this may also assist in overcoming a key 
paradox — that the international community ‘upholds the right to 
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self-determination but can do so little to provide for its consistent 
or effective implementation’ (Hurrell 2003: 297). In proposing the 
development of an ‘inclusive international legal system’ McCorquodale 
(2004) notes the precedents already set by the evolution of self-
determination, which was driven largely by peoples, often with the 
opposition of states. Such a development is appropriate in light of self-
determination’s status as a right of peoples against states (Crawford 
1988), and by the right’s significance as an essential condition for the 
realisation of all other human rights (Gros Espiell 1980, Kolodner 
1994–1995).
An inclusive international legal system has the potential to enhance 
popular agency and participation and to provide more accountable 
and independent systems of oversight for self-determination processes 
taking place within nations. The United Nations Charter famously 
begins ‘We the Peoples’. If the international legal system is to honour 
this phrasing, particularly in relation to the right of self-determination 
which serves peoples rather than states, it must combine strategies 
of empowerment with strategies of accessibility (Murphy 2006), 
something which may in part be achieved through the development 
of an inclusive international legal system.
‘Peoples’ v ‘territories’ v ‘human rights’: 
Do we have to define the self?
In traditional approaches to self-determination it has typically 
been argued that it is necessary to define the ‘self ’ claiming self-
determination. A 1990 UNESCO report brought together the most 
commonly proposed definitions of a ‘people’, notably emphasising 
the need for the group to share some objective characteristics such 
as common ethnicity, language or culture, and the importance of a 
common subjective desire to be identified as a people (International 
Meeting of Experts on the Further Study of the Concept of the Right 
of People 1990). However this ‘peoples’ approach is problematic in that 
it fails to recognise how peoples may change over time, it potentially 
enables peoples to be engineered in order to attain political ends, 
few individuals can happily state that they are members of one single 
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people, and no single definition of people-hood exists (McCorquodale 
1994).
In contrast, some commentators favour a ‘territories’ approach 
to self-determination, although this has not gained the same level of 
adherence. The territories approach focused historically on colonial 
boundaries, conceiving of self-determination as a peaceful vehicle for 
enabling the transfer of colonial territories from an imperial power to 
a colonial people. The key problem of the territories approach is that 
it ignores the range of means by which self-determination may be 
exercised, and in this way ‘is a reminder of the reckless indifference 
to peoples shown by those who decided on territorial boundaries after 
the First World War’ (McCorquodale 1994: 869).
A ‘human rights’ approach has been promoted by Robert 
McCorquodale (1994) as a means of providing clearer rules of 
adjudication for self-determination claims. The human rights approach 
evaluates self-determination claims within the context of the whole 
human rights framework, and especially those rights which may 
conflict with a people’s assertion of self-determination. In focusing not 
on ‘who is the self ?’ but on how self-determination will be exercised, 
this approach aims to enable the concurrent protection of the whole 
range of human rights to their fullest extent (McCorquodale 2006):
While the human rights approach does not make it possible to say in 
the abstract which peoples have the right of self-determination and the 
extent of any exercise of this right, it does provide a framework to enable 
every situation to be considered and all the relevant rights and interests 
to be taken into account, balanced and analysed … (McCorquodale 
1994: 885).
In order to explore how the human rights approach to self-
determination would work in practice, McCorquodale (1994) 
considers the notion that most human rights are not absolute values, 
but rather that limitations may sometimes be imposed to enable rights 
to interact in the real conditions of social life, as is the case with self-
determination. He states the general legal rules that any limitations 
which are imposed on the exercise of human rights are only imposed to 
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protect other rights and the interests of society, and that any limitations 
imposed are to be interpreted narrowly. So while self-determination 
applies wherever a people is subject to oppression it is subject to the 
presumption that exercises of self-determination cannot be permitted 
to destroy or impair the other human rights also enshrined in the 
international legal framework.
McCorquodale’s proposal finds support in some international 
legal commentary. James Anaya conceives of self-determination as 
‘a configurative principle’ of human rights law which is intertwined 
with individual human rights standards (1996: 77). When the right 
is considered in this light the human rights approach appears both 
logical and well-adapted to twenty-first century conceptions of the 
true significance of human rights in international relations. Indeed, 
Gerry Simpson argues that the only means of saving self-determination 
from a ‘descent into incoherence’ is an expansive interpretation of the 
right which recognises its links with autonomy, democracy, cultural 
self-expression and human rights (1996: 259). A renewal of such links 
through the human rights approach may also allay the fears of some who 
regard self-determination as divisive or dangerous. For example, Louis 
Beres (1994) has called for the balancing of self-determination with the 
needs of the entire global community in order to protect against the 
more extreme and violent out-workings of separatism, ethnic conflict 
and militaristic nationalism. The human rights approach is the only 
strategy yet proposed which attends to these concerns with both realism 
regarding the interests of the international community and a respect 
for the fundamental entitlements of individuals and peoples.
The human rights approach has obvious potential to overcome some 
of the weaknesses of the human rights framework which currently limit 
the capacity of claimant peoples to fully realise self-determination. 
McCorquodale’s strategy responds to the lack of enforcement power 
in international law by proposing a more conciliatory framework of 
negotiating self-determination. In this context it is foreseeable that 
states could be persuaded to sit with claimant peoples ‘at the same 
table’ on the proviso that a relationship of mutual goodwill could 
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be established. This element of the strategy also responds to the 
marginalisation of claimant peoples from international legal dialogue 
in that the voices of claimants may seem less threatening to states 
if they are expressed in a framework of negotiation. Further, the 
difficulty created by the dominance of political considerations in state 
responses to self-determination claims is addressed by the human rights 
approach. Arguably the evaluation of self-determination according 
to the ‘coherent legal framework’ of the international law on human 
rights may make politics a less decisive factor and instead promote 
negotiated agreements. The Canadian Supreme Court appeared to 
favour this outcome in giving its opinion on the potential secession 
of Québec from the Canadian federation. In that case it was held that 
a Québécois vote in favour of secession would have to be followed by 
‘principled negotiations’ with the other stakeholders in the federation 
to ensure that all rights were protected to the fullest degree (Reference 
re Secession of Québec).
Some respondents to this study gave specific examples of how the 
human rights approach could apply positively in practice. According to 
Kieran McEvoy (2006), ‘absolutist’ assertions of self-determination in 
Northern Ireland have been disaggregated over the past several years of 
the Irish peace process. Today, issues of entitlement, such as claims of 
British unionists to the ‘right to march’ or parade, are discussed more 
frequently in terms of competing rights frameworks, thus developing 
more practical solutions than were possible in the past. In Australia, 
too, the human rights approach lessens the risk of rights claims being 
rejected solely on the basis that they threaten the already protected 
rights of others. Professor Mick Dodson (2006) agrees that the cause 
of reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in 
Australia can only be achieved through a balancing of all rights and 
interests, as is advocated by the human rights approach. It would be 
mutually beneficial for states, claimant peoples and all others whose 
rights are engaged by a self-determination claim if states were to 
recognise the capacity of the human rights approach to transform their 
relationship to the concept of self-determination. Practical examples 
such as those given here show that, with the development of human 
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rights cultures in domestic settings, international legal standards on 
self-determination and human rights bear greatly enhanced positive 
potential.
Self-determination: Process or event?
Both because the right of self-determination does not elapse with the 
achievement of independence and because many self-determination 
solutions can be developed within existing state arrangements, the 
right ought to be conceived of as a process rather than a one-off event. 
Self-determination as process represents a key means of implementing 
the human rights approach to the right. A significant advantage of 
conceiving of self-determination as a process is that this conception is 
more open to the various means by which the right may be achieved. It 
promotes a less absolutist approach to sovereignty, which is helpful for 
Indigenous peoples in Australia, who typically assert self-determination 
within Australia’s borders. It also addresses the concerns of those who 
fear that the right can exacerbate rather than resolve conflict (Bell 
2005). For example, should the two Irish jurisdictions be united, a less 
absolutist approach to sovereignty might enable arrangements which 
retain some aspects of the northern jurisdiction (Comerford 2003) as a 
guarantee that all people on the island will be entitled to express their 
identity as they wish. In the Australian context, recognition of the 
right as process could involve the wider community with the notion 
of Indigenous self-determination and create parallel opportunities for 
reconciliation and the still absent recognition of Indigenous status.
The human rights approach to the process of self-determination also 
emphasises what is perhaps the right’s central value: the balance it strikes 
between universal relevance and contextually specific and culturally 
appropriate application. As previously discussed, self-determination 
may manifest in a wide variety of forms. As McCorquodale (2006) 
recognised in our interview, the concept informing all human rights 
is universal, but the exercise must always be culturally dependent. 
This value of the human rights approach is particularly important for 
claimants such as Indigenous peoples in Australia, whose cultural values 
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are so distinct from non-Indigenous communities that their claims 
for self-determination have been misunderstood by non-Indigenous 
society. There is no doubt that respect for the universal application 
of self-determination is essential, but the right must be capable of 
adaptation to the particular circumstances of each claimant people.
Conclusion
Self-determination’s development from principle to right was ‘one 
of the most dramatic normative developments of the twentieth 
century’ (Falk 2000: 124). Scores of peoples around the globe have 
employed the language and spirit of the right to advance their claims 
for independence, thus forever associating self-determination with 
the movement towards decolonisation. In the twenty-first century, 
however, the status of self-determination is threatened by claims that 
the right has exhausted its decolonising mission. Yet examples from the 
Irish and Indigenous Australian contexts demonstrate the continuing 
stifling influence of colonialism upon peoples who seek to determine 
their own destinies as they see fit. This circumstance warrants the 
restoration of self-determination in the present day in order that the 
right may retain its emancipatory role whilst also furthering and 
informing the broader framework of human rights to which every 
person is entitled. A human rights approach to self-determination can 
help to open international legal discourse to the voices of claimant 
peoples so that their experiences are no longer marginalised and their 
equal right to self-determination gains recognition and protection 
into the twenty-first century.
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